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 1 
Introduction1 
In recent literature there exists general agreement that institutions regulating access to arable land in 
sub-Saharan Africa are characterised by ambiguous and open-ended rules and norms. Due to the 
importance of land as a resource and new (or sometimes recurring) policies for regulation of land, a 
discussion has emerged regarding the consequences of this open-endedness for the social 
transformation in African societies. The question asked is: which groups seem to profit the most 
from a contextualised and extremely negotiable manner of dealing with claims and disputes 
regarding access to land?  Is it - like one may observe in many places in Latin America, Asia and 
Eastern Europe - the most powerful and most resourceful groups among the population that manage 
to impose their interests and appropriate land at the expense of the weaker and poorer groups in 
society, or – on the contrary - is it the poorest who manage to impede the accumulation of wealth by 
utilising the ambiguity and open-endedness in the access regulating institutions to their own favour? 
 
This debate must be considered separate and different from a much older and more comprehensive 
debate about the adequacy and the efficiency of existing methods of land tenure (generally referred 
to as customary tenure) even though the former debate has emerged as a result of the latter. The 
question now is not whether customary tenure impedes or favours agricultural growth and economic 
development, but whether the ambiguity of these institutions are serving the richer and more 
powerful segments of society in their struggle for accumulation of wealth and power, or – on the 
contrary - whether it functions to protect poor farmers who still very much dominate in African 
agriculture. Crucial to this debate is the question of who is conceived to have developed ‘custom’ 
and who controls it. Important contributions by E. Colson2  and M. Chanock3 showed how close 
custom, as it emerged in Zambia and Malawi, were linked to the interests of the colonial 
administration in the two territories.  Others, such as S. Berry4  and S.F. Moore5 also argue that the 
emergence of customary law to a large extent must be seen as the project of the colonial state. 
However,  
 
‘[u]nder indirect rule colonial regimes incorporated on-going struggles over power 
and social identity into the structure of colonial administration, and elicited 
conflicting testimonies from their African subjects concerning the meaning of 
‘native law and custom’. As a result property rights and labour relations were neither 
transformed according to the English model nor frozen in anachronistic ‘communal’ 
forms, but instead became subjects to perpetual contest’.6  
 
                                                     
1 This article received funding through CMI’s project ‘The poor and the Judiciary’ funded by the Research Council of 
Norway. We wish in particular to thank magistrates in Thyolo and Mangochi districts for their open and kind 
collaboration as well as Siri Gloppen and Magnus Hatlebakk at CMI for valuable support and comments. 
2 E. Coulson, ‘The Impact of the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land Rights’, in V. Turner (ed.), Colonialism in 
Africa (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp.193-215. 
3 M. Chanock, Law, custom and social order: the colonial experience in Malawi and Zambia, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, African studies series 45, 1985); M. Chanock, ‘Paradigms, policies and properties: a review of the 
customary law of land tenure’ in: K. Mann and R. Roberts (eds.), Law in colonial Africa, (Portsmouth : Heinemann 
Educational Books, Social history of Africa series, 1991), pp. 61-84. 
4 S. Berry, ‘Hegemony on a shoestring, Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural Land’ Africa, 62, 3 (1992), pp. 327-355; 
Berry S. (2002), "Debating the land question in Africa", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 44, 4:638-68 (1992, 
2002). 
5 S. F. Moore, ‘Changing African Land Tenure: Reflections on the Incapacities of the State’, European Journal of 
Development Research, 10, 2 (1998), pp. 33-49. 
6 Berry, Hegemony on a Shoestring, p. 345. 
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Pauline Peters is among those who most consistently have been arguing that parts of the research on 
African land tenure may have gone too far in emphasising the processual character and the open-
endedness attached to the land regulating institutions. According to Peters there are reasons to 
believe that the negotiability has its clear limits as what J.C. Scott7 called a ‘weapon of the weak’ 
and that ambiguity systematically are helping the more resourceful groups of society in a manner 
that contributes to increased inequality and to acceleration in the on-going process of class 
formation in Africa in general and in Malawi more specifically. She develops this argument in 
several articles where she sometimes draws upon a broad and general research material8 and 
sometimes more specifically upon her own empirical data from Malawi.9  
 
In this paper we shall critically discuss Peters’ argument with reference to an analysis of available 
literature and our own empirical data from Malawi’s southern Region which is the same area as 
where Peters has been working. Although analyses on economic change between various socio-
economic groups are limited, we share her concern about increased socio economic inequality at the 
national as well as at the local levels. Classes in the sense of stable and distinct socio-economic 
groups with great variations in access to material assets are not easy to find at the local level, but 
nationally it probably makes sense to talk of an emerging formation of classes. However, increased 
social differentiation in a mainly agricultural society does of course not a priori mean that the land 
tenure system is accelerating such a process. We shall show how Peters’ analysis put too little 
emphasis on other and more important modes of appropriation of surplus in Malawi’s political 
economy such as international aid and labour migration in particular. It is mainly through surplus 
appropriation at this level that it is possible to understand how the national and local elites have 
emerged and are being reproduced. The wealthier segments of the population continue to invest in 
other sectors than agriculture since the latter is still considered risky with low profitability. A recent 
assessment of poverty and vulnerability in Malawi reveals extremely egalitarian patterns in 
customary land distribution as well as a surprisingly low level of commercialisation of agricultural 
products deriving from Malawian smallholders.  
 
Our analysis of a number of court cases regarding land supports the views of the constructivist 
school10 in that the characteristics of customary tenure are important elements explaining this state 
of affairs. Various normative regulations embedded in customary tenure such as inheritance, 
investment of work and financial transactions continuously produce dilemmas that are utilised to 
keep foreigners at a distance and limit the land expansions of wealthy villagers.  Furthermore, we 
show that Peters puts too little weight on the overall development in Malawi’s agricultural sector. 
When people invest in agriculture it mainly takes place in the private sector, often called the estate 
sector, which is defined as external to customary tenure, and where land is privately owned or 
leased on long term contracts with government. If people prefer to invest in estate land it is 
precisely because of much better security on investments in the estate sector compared to the 
situation on customary land. But even estate land is challenged by the customary tenure. The 
demarcation of what is estate land and what belongs to customary land is subject to continuous 
negotiation and re-definition. Our study shows that local farmers and the traditional authority, over 
time, manage to re-appropriate estate land into customary land thereby safeguarding the interests of 
                                                     
7 J. C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, (New Haven and London, Yale University 
Press, 1985). 
8 P. E. Peters, ‘The Limits of Negotiability: Security, Equity and Class Formation in Africa's Land System’, in K. Juul and 
C. Lund (eds.), Negotiating Property in Africa, (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002), pp. 45-66; P. E. Peters, ‘Inequality 
and Social Conflict Over Land in Africa’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 4, 3 (July 2004), pp. 269-314. 
9 P. E. Peters, ‘Bewitching Land: the Role of Land Disputes in Kin to Strangers and in Class Formation in 
Malawi’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 28, 1 (March 2002), pp. 155-178; Peters, P.E. and D. 
Kambewa, ‘Whose Security? Deepening Social Conflict over ‘Customary’ Land in the Shadow of Land 
Tenure Reform in Malawi’, (Harvard University, CID Working Paper No. 142, March 2007).  
10 One of the most influential representatives of this school is S. Berry. See references to her work elsewhere in the text. 
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the poor local farmers at the expense of the estate owners. It is therefore possible to say that the 
ambiguity and open-endedness of customary tenure to a large extent explains why the estate sector 
has not grown more than it has since it was created. 
 Most of our data derives from four shorter fieldworks in Thyolo and Mangochi districts in 
Malawi’s Southern Region in the period from June 2005 to March 2007. After initial investigations 
regarding levels and types of land conflicts we started to look at land conflicts which had reached 
the court system. After the identification of approximately 120 court cases in three Magistrates’ 
Courts, 45 cases were selected for further analysis.11 The main selection criteria were of a purely 
practical nature: the case should be closed, a verdict pronounced and the court files should be 
available. Less than ten cases were not included due to their content. They were all border conflicts 
between smallholders involving very small land areas. In addition to the court files which often 
proved to be more comprehensive than we initially had feared, we had the opportunity to discuss all 
cases with the magistrates who ruled the cases. Finally, approximately 20 cases were made subject 
to a more detailed investigation through interviews with representatives of the traditional authority 
who had been directly or indirectly involved in the case. In this type of research, based upon short 
visits to the sites, the danger of misunderstandings are considerable and one of our concerns was not 
to give concerned people a pretext for a re-play of the case. For ethical reasons we therefore avoided 
interviews with the individual plaintiffs and defendants. A different approach would have forced us 
to reduce the number of cases under detailed investigation further. 
Smallholders in southern Malawi, and the role of 
agriculture in the formation of national and local elites  
40 percent of Malawi’s 12 million inhabitants live in the rural areas of the Southern Region. The 
population density is among the highest in rural Africa and reaches 146 per km² (97 and 268 for 
Mangochi and Thyolo districts respectively).12 In most of the Shire Highlands (including Thyolo) 
virgin land is almost non-existent. In lower lying areas such as the in the Shire Valley (including 
Mangochi) virgin land of some quality is scarce but may still be found. Cultivated land is mainly 
rain fed and used for staple crops such as maize. A smaller part is wet land or dimba often used for 
horticulture. Some smallholders also cultivate cash crops such as burley tobacco, cotton, tea, 
paprika, groundnuts and chilli, but in limited amounts.  Amongst smallholders, the distribution of 
landholdings is mostly concentrated between 0.2 and 2 hectares.13 The average size of the largest 20 
percent of all holdings is 3 ha. Poverty is a common feature in the smallholder sector. With a 
poverty line at MK 16,16514 per year and an ultra-poverty line at MK10, 029, 64 percent of the rural 
population in the south was classified as poor and 32 percent as ultra poor in 2005. This is 
significantly higher than in the less populated regions in the centre and the north of the country. For 
the country as a whole the poverty and ultra-poverty rates are 52 and 22 percent respectively. 
Poverty rates have been fairly stable in the period between 1998 and 2005. 
 
Since the start of the colonial era the role of agriculture in the social differentiation processes has 
varied. Initially, it played an important role in the creation of the first elites. Already in 1894 the 
newly appointed commissioner of the protectorate approved 69 land claims covering approximately 
                                                     
11 The numbering of cases in the Magistrates’ courts is somewhat confusing. Most common is that each magistrate keeps 
his/hers own numbering and one may therefore find more than one case with the same case number in the same court. In 
this paper cases are referred to according to our own numbering system.  
12 Republic of Malawi, ‘The 1998 Population and Housing Census’, (Zomba, National Statistics Office, 1999), available 
at http://www.nso.malawi.net/data_on_line/demography/census_98/analytical_report.pdf, retrieved on 3 December 2007. 
13 Unless otherwise stated, all figures in this paragraph are quoted from Republic of Malawi & World Bank, Malawi; 
Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment, Investing in our Future, (June 2006), available  at 
http://www.aec.msu.edu/fs2/mgt/caadp/malawi_pva_draft_052606_final_draft.pdf, retrieved on 3 December 2007. 
14 The exchange rate at time of assessment was 1USD = 135 Malawi Kwacha. 
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15 percent of the land area.15 Except for huge concessions in the northern and central parts granted 
first to the African Lakes Company and later transferred to the British South African Company most 
of the estates were found in the Shire Highlands in the south. Needless to say, almost all who 
received the so called certificate of claim and who were of European origin became the first elite in 
the territory. But the protectorate never became a settler state like in neighbouring Southern 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). It was British imperial interests rather than the immediate interests of a 
newly established land owing class who were to guide the politics in the protectorate. Colonial 
administrators and estate owners could have close social contacts, but their relations were also 
characterised by clear conflicts regarding policies of land and agriculture.16 Many estate owners in 
the 1940s and 1950s chose to sell, mainly due to economic problems but partly as a result of 
disagreements with the agricultural policies.  
 
Since independence the government has chosen to lease out estate land rather than sell it and the 
1970s and 1980s saw a dramatic growth in leaseholds as well as in the areas under cultivation. It is 
estimated that the total number of estates grew from 250 in 1970 to some 30 000 farms in 1995 
covering an area in 1995 around one million hectares.17 Of this only 34 000 ha was freehold land, 
mostly large tea plantations in the Shire Highlands and in Thyolo district in particular, the rest is 
leasehold. Leaseholds are generally much smaller than the old freehold estates and range from 10 to 
500 ha. Before 1980 the expansion of leaseholds mainly involved larger companies, but this has 
changed. In 1995, 70 percent of all estates were less than 30 ha.  
 
In Malawi like in most of sub-Saharan Africa the most prominent and powerful elites have emerged 
and are being reproduced through their political control rather than through their control of 
production.18 However, parts of this elite have been able to convert their influence into large estate 
holdings. The introduction of a multi-party system in 1994 has not changed the elite structure in any 
fundamental way.19 It is beyond doubt that, after independence, a close correlation exists between 
affiliation to the national elite and access to leaseholds and that this situation persists. President 
Banda made systematic use of leasehold contracts as an incentive for political loyalty. But it is not 
through their control of land that big leaseholders constitute a socio-economic elite, it is the other 
way around. The political liberalisation in 1994 implied that foreign aid increased substantially. One 
of the main foci, not only among the present elite, but also among a large part of an educated 
middleclass in the urban areas is to secure as much access to the aid flows as possible. International 
aid may have become the main driver in the class formation processes at national level today. 
 
At the local level the creation of the estates opened up for some social differentiation with a more 
complex organisation of work. All estates had their foremen (capitaõ) who supervise and control 
the work and who thereby also receive privileges. Such functions came to be closely related to and 
overlapping with positions in the traditional authority system as this system evolved since the first 
decades of last century.  But privileges and wealth were first of all achieved as a result of contacts 
with and positions in the colonial administration. The first economic elites to emerge locally were 
those who got education in the mission schools and later salary-based positions and jobs within the 
colonial and national administration. This wealth opened up for a certain degree of private local 
investments even though economic failures were (and are) as common as the successes. Another 
important opportunity was through labour migration mainly to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. 
                                                     
15 B. Pachai, Malawi: the History of the Nation, (London, Longman, 1973). 
16 L. White, Magomero: Portrait of an African village, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
17 All figures in this paragraph are quoted from Anon.., ‘Land People and Production on the Estates of Malawi; a Guide to 
the Surveys of the Estate Land Utilisation Study 1995-7’, (unpublished report produced as part of the Estate Land 
Utilisation Study, Lilongwe, 1997).  
18 G. C. Z. Mhone (ed.), Malawi at the Crossroads, the Post-Colonial Political Economy, (Harare, SAPES Books, 1992).  
19 H. Englund (ed.), A Democracy of Chameleons, Politics and Culture in the New Malawi, (Stockholm, Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, 2002). 
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It was part of the colonial policy of the protectorate to provide these countries with additional 
labour in the mines and in estate agriculture. The importance of the labour migration varied 
substantially according to areas. In Mangochi it was very common and this explains why the 
economic differentiation is more pronounced in this area than in many other places in Malawi. In 
Thyolo labour migration abroad was more seldom probably because of the big tea estates. Their role 
was ambiguous. On the one hand they represented a deeply hated system of forced labour 
(thangata) which tended to exploit the smallholders in the area. On the other hand they provided 
opportunities for limited cash incomes without having to move. 
 
The labour migrants often remitted, but more common savings were invested upon return of the 
migrant. McCracken20 shows how the labour migration led to a considerable technological and 
economic development in the fisheries of the southern part of Lake Malawi in the late 1940s and 
1950s. Our own work21 confirms that local investments in Mangochi, either from national wage 
labour or labour migration abroad, continued into the 1990s. It also illustrates the diversity of the 
investments (e.g. in transport, trade, rest houses, maize mills, brick production, animal husbandry 
etc.) and how this gave room for a group of ‘lords’ who developed limited economic powers 
locally. Only small parts of the investments seem to have been invested in agriculture, and when it 
was the case it was in leasehold rather than in customary land. Since the 1980s labour migration 
among the local population started to diminish and has now stopped completely. Even though 
migration from some areas like Mangochi remains high it has changed from labour to trade 
migration and the chances of generating surpluses have been dramatically reduced. 
 
One of the reasons why the labour migrants preferred to invest in estates rather than in customary 
land may have been a prohibition to produce burley tobacco on customary land which the new 
government introduced in the late 1960s. When this prohibition was lifted around 1990 it opened up 
a new investment venue for wealthier smallholders which they received eagerly. Another possible 
reason for limited investments in customary land could be the marketing restrictions established by 
government on cash crops in general which forced the smallholders (at least formally) to sell their 
crops to government agencies (Admarc) at artificially low prices and which lasted for 
approximately the same time period as the prohibition on production of tobacco. In 2005, between 
70 and 80 percent of the total production and 50 percent of the exports of burley tobacco derived 
from customary land where some 350 000 households were involved. However, the relative share of 
tobacco smallholders is much lower in Southern Region than in the rest of the country.22  
 
Also people associated with what is now called the traditional authority also represent a kind of 
local elite. The institution has its roots back to the first years of last century when the colonial 
power established their administration, but it was only with the Native Authority Ordinance in 1933 
and the establishment of indirect rule in 1936 that the authority was institutionalised. It constitutes a 
hierarchy of local leaders starting with the chiefs on top, through sub chiefs, group village head and 
the village head who constitute the lowest level. The traditional authority has a strong legitimacy 
and the leaders are often found to be wealthier than the population in general, even though our work 
also revealed that many – even at the level of chiefs - remained poor. However, the assets controlled 
by wealthy local leaders were found, either to originate from transfers from the national political 
elite or from non-agricultural productive activities often outside the village. In one village in 
                                                     
20 J. McCracken, ‘Fishing and the Colonial Economy: the Case of Malawi’, Journal of African History, 28, 3 (1987), 413-
429.  
21 M. Hara and E. Jul-Larsen, ‘The “Lords” of Malombe; an Analysis of Fishery Development and Changes in Fishing 
Effort on Lake Malombe, Malawi’, in E. Jul-Larsen, J. Kolding, J. Raakjær Nielsen, R. Overå, P. van Zwieten (eds.), 
Management, Co-management or No Management? Major Dilemmas in Southern African Freshwater Fisheries, Rome, 
FAO, Fisheries Technical Paper 426/2, 2003), pp. 179-200, available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y5056e/ 
5056e00.htm, retrieved on 3 December 2007. 
22 Republic of Malawi and World Bank, Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment, pp. 152-153. 
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Mangochi we found close economic collaboration between two or three households organised 
around the village headwoman23 which included labour migration to Blantyre, an international civil 
servant, a petrol station in town as well as a shop, a maize-mill and fishing boats operated from the 
village. Despite their important role in the distribution of customary land we have never observed or 
heard that members of the traditional authority control larger areas of customary land for their own 
private purposes than the rest of the population. Neither did we hear of leaders who had invested in 
estate land. This may probably be explained by the difficulties such investments could create due to 
their local functions. 
 
Even though it is approximately 15 years since the restrictions were lifted, the lifting does not seem 
to have influenced the distribution in smallholder agriculture very much. The recently published 
poverty and vulnerability assessment draws a picture of a smallholder sector in 2005, which is land-
egalitarian with a subsistence-oriented structure.24 Among the 2.4 million rural households in 
Malawi 11 percent are landless while 75 percent cultivate plots less than 2 ha. Only 13 percent has 
landholdings larger than 2 ha.25 The difference in size of landholdings related to the wealth of the 
households is very small. In the bottom wealth quintile the average size is 0.9 ha while it is 1.1 ha in 
the wealthiest quintile. At the same time only 52 percent of all households in the country sold some 
portion of their agricultural production on the market.26 Neither did market relations vary much 
between the wealthiest and the poorest quintiles; 40 percent among the poorest and 57 percent 
among the wealthiest sold a portion of their crop at the market.  
 
The assessment also confirms what is indicated above. Local wealth, rather than being generated in 
agriculture, seems to derive from surplus generated in other activities: ‘The percentage of 
households with less than 0.2 ha is similar across all wealth quintiles. This reflects the fact that 
there are a large numbers of richer households for whom farming is only a marginal activity’.27 The 
assessment also shows how a higher share of households under the poverty line (0.95) has access to 
land compared to those above this line (0.84). Even for high quality dimba wetland the share with 
access is higher among the poor.28 
 
Until now it does not seem as if customary agriculture has been important in the processes of 
economic differentiation or in formation of the Malawian elites. Like in so many other African 
countries it has been access to state resources which has and continues to be the crucial element in 
these processes coupled with whatever funds that have derived from international labour and trade 
migration. There is no doubt that the present elites use agriculture as an opportunity to invest parts 
of their wealth, but when doing so it seems mostly to be the urban elite who invests in the estate 
sector.  Part of the reason is undoubtedly connected to the government’s restrictions which until 
early in the 1990s were imposed on the customary sector but it remains to see how the tenure of 
customary land in itself affects the differentiation processes.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
23 It is quite common to find female village heads and more seldom group village heads. We have not met or heard of any 
cases of female chiefs.  
24 ibid. pp. 151-165. 
25 In rural southern region the figures are 13, 79 and 8 percent respectively. 
26 The figure is 45 percent for rural southern region. 
27 ibid: 155 
28 ibid. p.153 
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Recurring dilemmas in customary tenure: inheritance vs. 
work vs. assets  
This paper looks at the empirical evidence on how customary tenure in all its facets affects the 
differentiation processes. It does not present a comprehensive analysis of the development and 
functioning of customary tenure in the country. Such contributions already exist29 and we mainly 
base our analysis on them. In different ways they all support what in the two last decades have 
become the dominant interpretations of customary law and land tenure in sub-Saharan Africa.30 
Custom as well as local authority is a direct product of the colonial development in the 20th century 
and of the needs and interests of the colonial powers. Customary law is based on a mixture of pre-
colonial regulatory principles as well as various practical regulations deemed useful and adequate 
by the colonial administrations. Likewise, the local traditional authority derives its power and 
legitimacy on a combination of government support and on shared myths of descent and origin. 
Obviously, it became difficult to converge the meaning of these sometimes very different norms and 
regulations into some sort of coherent social basis and the result has been that practice related to 
customary law is characterised considerable ambiguity, lack of predictability and where the local 
actors are left with ample room for manipulation and redefinition of what a case is all about.  
 
The fact that the formal judicial system through the Magistrates Court and the High Court has, since 
the political liberalisation in 1994, taken over the functions of the old Traditional Court which were 
controlled by the chiefs does not seem to have changed much to this picture. Formal jurisdiction 
(like e.g. the land act in function) continues to refer to traditional law as the main regulating 
principle. Given its ambiguity the courts therefore often rely on the traditional authority for defining 
the content of traditional law. Furthermore, local leaders, from family heads to chiefs, continue to 
be directly involved in solving local conflicts before they reach the courts. The court cases show 
that even District Commissioners sometimes were included in the chain of conflict resolving 
meetings before a case went to court. This system of conflict resolution is not only a question of 
brokerage; the leaders also pronounce verdicts and a considerable amount of pressure is put on the 
parties to accept the solutions they pronounce. The system has been called the customary justice 
system and we find the concept useful since it reveals how the customary realm is reproduced and 
even expanded into what – for lack of better expressions – is often described as the modern or 
formal judicial sector, irrespective of the abolition of important customary institutions such as the 
Traditional Courts.  
 
In the customary tenure, rights to land are never exclusive, but shared between the individual and 
various groups to which every person has to be part of. In Malawi’s Southern Region the most 
important group regulating rights to land is the matriliny (mbumba). Since the common pattern of 
residence is for the husband to settle in the village of the wife (chikamwini), the man seldom holds 
inheritance rights to the land where he lives and works even if his children do. In the opposite case, 
where the wife moves to the village of the husband (chitengwa) neither the woman nor her children 
will have hereditary rights to the land she works. Chitengwa is common if the husband claims 
leadership rights in the matriliny or in the village. In both cases these principles may create 
difficulties if the spouse holding hereditary rights is the first to die. At the end of the funeral 
ceremonies (nsudzulo) the remaining spouse may be requested to move back to her or his village. 
The principle of chikamwini opens for a very strong de facto control of the land by the sisters in the 
                                                     
29 See e.g. Channock, Law, Custom and Social Order; Channock, Paradigms, Policies and Properties; P. E. Peters  
‘Revisiting the puzzle of matriliny in South-Central Africa’, Critique of Anthropology 17, 2 (1997), pp. 125-146; Peters, 
Bewitching Land ; White, Magomero. 
30 See e.g. S. Berry, No Condition is Permanent, the Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
(Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). For a more synthesised presentation of the debate, see Peters, The limits 
of negotiability  
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lineage and land is most often transferred directly from women to their daughters. Another 
important group is the village which is an assembly of lineages and where the village head is 
supposed to be a descendant of the village founder. He or she is part of the traditional authority who 
controls virgin land and who can allocate parts of that land to strangers who wants to settle in the 
village. In both districts conflicts between lineage heads (mwinimbumba) and traditional authority 
regarding land which for various reasons had been (temporarily) abandoned by a mbumba were 
common. 
 
The most important competing principle to inheritance is labour that individuals invest in the land. 
Rights to land are always intimately connected to an active use of it and J-P. Chauveau31 has a point 
when he claims that labour often is a more fundamental regulating norm than inheritance since 
hereditary rights vanish quickly unless the land is in continuous use. Clearing virgin or abandoned 
land is particularly important with regard to land claims and may be used as a strategy to increase 
the landholdings of an individual or a family. The dominant reason behind the conflicts studied lies 
in the dilemma between work and descent and conflicts derive from disagreements about how to 
draw the line between the two principles. 27 of the 45 selected court cases concerned dilemmas 
between descent and work in one way or another. Grosso modo the dilemma was found to manifest 
itself in four different ways.  
 
In Thyolo the most frequent type are conflicts among members of the same mbumba – often cousins 
- where the person who has worked the land over some time is being challenged by another due to 
different interpretations of who in the mbumba gave the land to whom. The second type and quite 
common in Mangochi are conflicts between newcomers given land by the traditional authority and 
persons from the already established mbumba. ‘Newcomer’ is here relative since many of them may 
be 2nd generation and the conflicts are often recurring phenomena which have lasted over longer 
periods of time. The dilemma is the same: the former has cleared and developed the land while the 
latter claim it was given to them or their parents. Thirdly, some conflicts in Thyolo are connected to 
old abandoned estate land taken over by the government and redistributed to the villagers. This 
practice which has lasted since well before independence has deliberately been used by the national 
authority to try to establish competing individual land rights for men which could be transferred 
from fathers to sons. As observed by both Peters32 and White33 the court cases also show how in 
such cases the man’s sisters or others in the mbumba are quick to present their claims often at the 
expense of the widow and the children. Several of the court cases date back more than 40 years. 
Finally a limited number of court cases are connected to the principles of chikamwini and chitengwa 
and men or women who may have worked a plot of land the whole of their adult life are refused to 
remain on the land of their late spouses’ mbumba .  
 
It is not possible to find any patterns of preference either for inheritance or for work in the court 
cases, whether we look at the magistrates’ or previous verdicts in the customary justice system. 
Each case is dealt with in contextual terms and verdicts seem to a large extent to depend on the 
trustworthiness of the parties and their witnesses. Besides, the relationship between inheritance and 
work does not correlate with social differentiation. In some cases, like in those implying chikamwini 
or chitengwa the weakest party is most often the person who claims rights through his or her work. 
In cases of redistribution of old estate land the weakest party can easily prove to be those claiming 
rights through descent.  
 
                                                     
31 J.P. Chauveau, ‘How does an Institution Evolve? Land, Politics, Intergenerational Relations and the Institution of the 
Tutorat amongst autochthones and immigrants (Gban Region, Côte d’Ivoire)’, in R. Kuba and C. Lentz, Land and the 
politics of belonging in West Africa, (Leiden and Boston, Brill, 2006). 
32 Peters, Revisiting the Puzzle and Peters, Bewitching Land. 
33 White, Magomero. 
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However, two relevant aspects seem possible to generalise upon. One is related to the time it takes 
to settle a case. Not only does it take time to go through the whole chain in the customary justice 
system, but old cases have also a tendency to re-occur in slightly new dresses. One case regarding 
old estate land distributed in 1964 (T19) where sisters of the buyer claimed the land rights at the 
expense of the buyer’s adopted son was settled in the magistrates’ court in 2004 and the son was 
given the land. In our follow up of the case in 2007 we found that the conflict was still alive, but 
now it was other persons from the same mbumba who claimed the rights referring to a combination 
of inheritance and work invested on the land at the expense of the same son. The ‘new’ case was at 
present dealt with by the village head and the group village head who both were new and had not 
participated in the original case. The oldest conflict in our material concerned land given to a group 
of newcomers to Mangochi from Liloma Island in 1917 (M10). The conflict started less than ten 
years after their arrival and seems to have been recurring ever since each time someone saw a use 
for it. As a result of these types of conflicts land is often lying idle for shorter or longer periods and 
even though smallholder agriculture does not require much physical investments it is not difficult to 
understand how customary land demonstrate clear limitations for someone interested in expanding 
cultivation in order to increase ones wealth.  
 
A second generalised pattern is connected to the arguments used by the parties, the witnesses as 
well as those pronouncing verdicts. A phenomenon like the welfare situation of the parties is often 
made relevant as an argument, particularly in the case of extreme poverty. Both traditional leaders 
as well as magistrates may openly refer to the welfare situation of the parties as an element in the 
background for their verdict. It proves what many have said before us that the customary justice 
system tends to be more concerned with the social cohesion at local level than with the rights of the 
individuals as such. 
 
A third regulating principle is different types of monetary transactions. A variety of local 
arrangements have always existed to secure temporary access to land for individuals without 
permanent rights in an area, normally referred to as rent (kubwereka munda) . This can be 
arrangements between an individual and a village headman, a head of lineage or the head of a 
particular household. Rights involved as well as level of compensation vary almost from case to 
case and it is difficult to say exactly when money entered as a part of the rent arrangements. Rent 
easily lead to conflict when an individual can start claiming more permanent rights due to the work 
invested in the land.34 However, a new element has emerged in the last decades, in particular in the 
Shire Highlands. As opposed to leases people have now started to talk of sales (kugulitsa munda). 
Several authors35  have observed the same and relate its emergence to increased population density. 
Sale of land must be considered particularly relevant with reference to processes of social 
differentiation.  
 
In the common rhetoric about customary tenure sale in the sense of exclusive individualised 
transference of rights is considered a contradiction in terms. Nevertheless, all traditional leaders and 
magistrates indicate that something resembling sales have become common in areas within Thyolo 
district even though the sums of money involved generally remain modest. Going through the court 
registry in Thyolo also show that such land sales have become an important source of dispute and 
10 of the 21 selected court cases from Thyolo deal with such conflicts. In Mangochi district sales of 
                                                     
34 When urban people who rent plots for cultivating their own maize are being moved from one plot to another it is often 
an illustration on how the holder try to avoid such claims from emerging.  
35 Peters and Kambewa, Whose security; T. Takane, ‘Customary Land Tenure, Inheritance Rules, and Smallholder 
Farmers in Malawi’, , Institute of Developing Economies, Japan, Discussion Paper No. 104, available at 
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Dp/pdf/104_takane.pdf; retrieved on 3 December 2007, S. Holden, R. 
Kaarhus,and R. Lunduka, ‘Land Policy Reform: The role of land markets and women’s land rights in Malawi’, (Ås. 
Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB), Noragric Report No. 36, 2006), available at 
http://www.umb.no/noragric/publications/reports/NoragricRep36.pdf, retrieved on 3 December 2007. 
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this kind is reported to be very rare and our data shows no cases. Instead it was common that land 
was rented for periods varying between three and ten years. Conditions and prices seemed to vary a 
lot from one area to another. Several of the court cases from Mangochi make reference to rent (in 
one it is claimed that rights have been transferred permanently), but no court case seems to have 
derived from conflicts related to the rent as such.  
 
Most traditional leaders and magistrates indicate that they accept the practices of land sales as a new 
element of customary tenure. Chiefs do so despite the fact that it reduces their influence on 
distribution of land and their control over who can claim permanent rights to land in their 
jurisdiction area.  In our discussions they explicitly considered such sales as exclusive transactions  
‘A sale is a sale’ and ‘selling land is like selling a pair of shoes’ were recurring ways to express 
their interpretation of the new phenomenon. However, much as customary tenure now seems to 
recognize sale, a lot of confusion exists regarding who is entitled to sell land (i.e. the individual or 
the mbumba). In addition there is also a continuous dispute about the role of the Traditional 
Authority in the transactions and we found in many of thee cases that the level of conflict within the 
traditional authority could be as high as between the parties. Furthermore, it proved that the 
traditional leaders are far less rigid in their legal practice than what they sound like from our 
discussions. If a seller expresses remorse the customary justice system will do what it can to find 
ways to retransfer the land in question, normally through back-sale. In all the cases examined, 
conflict arose either as a result of disagreement about mandate to sell or of remorse from the seller. 
In cases where the traditional authority witnessed the sale, and there was enough evidence that the 
transaction had taken place, one would expect that pronouncements by the local leaders and the 
magistrates would be in favour of the buyer. However, this only happened in 2 of the 10 cases.  
 
In five cases traditional leaders and magistrates offered the seller the option to buy back the land. In 
another (T6) a brother who was living away from the village of birth had, together with a sister, 
inherited a dimba garden from their father. At the death of the father the two agreed to raise a 
tombstone at his grave with money from the sales of bananas the sister grew in the garden. 
However, she used the money for something else and the brother had to pay for the stone. He 
therefore sold the garden to a cousin for MK2000 despite resistance from the sister. The court ruled 
for the buyer36 but advised the sister to refund the money if she wanted to lay claim to the land. In 
terms of our argument the buyer was entitled to the land and yet the magistrate still put in a “buy 
back” clause. In the second case where rights were given to the buyer (T3) we did a follow up. 
According to the village head it proved that despite the ruling in 2003 the land in question was now 
back in the hands of the complainant who had lost the case and her mbumba. In their study from 
Zomba, Peters and Kambewa37 also came across the phenomenon where family members had to put 
up money to buy land from a brother who was intent on selling it to strangers and they demonstrate 
the uncertainty connected to this type of transactions from the point of view of the buyer. 
 
In the remaining cases, the magistrates looked at the circumstances surrounding the sale such as 
reasons that led to the sale or the length of time one had stayed on the piece of land. In general the 
villagers, the traditional authority and the customary justice system all try as much as possible to 
secure land from being ‘taken away’ by way of sales.  
 
The court cases on customary tenure whether they regard the dilemma between inheritance and 
work or between inheritance and sale demonstrate how difficult it is to make use of customary land 
to accumulate landholdings. It seems as if those with legitimate rights of inheritance or those who 
can document long time presence on the land seem to stand a good chance in keeping control over 
it. This may be the reason why we find few strangers among the buyers of land in cases. Local 
                                                     
36 The cousin was the defendant in the case while the sister was the plaintiff 
37 Peters and Kambewa, Whose security. 
CMI WORKING PAPER SECURITY FOR MANY OR SURPLUS FOR THE FEW? WP 2007: 9 
 11 
communities have so many means to exclude people who they do not want. Witchcraft accusations, 
spreading of unfavourable rumours and small actions of sabotage are all well documented strategies 
to exclude others. In one of her articles Peters38 bases most of her argument upon observed 
exclusions as a result of witchcraft allegations within families. However, the problem is that there is 
nothing in her data that indicates significant socio-economic differences between those who exclude 
and those being excluded. Over many years the overall message from studies on witchcraft in 
Africa has been that witchcraft allegations have a socially levelling functions rather than the 
contrary. Besides, her field data also reveals that those being excluded often manage to find new 
land in other areas and landlessness is therefore avoided. Land exclusion processes do therefore not 
necessarily lead to processes of social differentiation, even less to the formation of classes.  
Smallholders’ trespass on estate land; the dynamics of the 
Malawian land structure  
Smallholders do not only fight and quarrel with each other.  Conflicts between holders of customary 
land on one side and private land holders on the other are as common and as old as conflicts 
between customary landholders. In a national study about estate land L. D. Mapemba39  claims that 
2/3 of the estates in Malawi have been encroached sometimes in their existence, but most of the 
conflicts never reach the courts. We found no court cases in Thyolo and eight in Mangochi which 
concerned allegations from estate holders against local farmers encroaching on their land40. This 
geographical imbalance has also been observed by others. In a sister study to that of Mapenda, 
Steele et.al41  shows that encroachment on tea estates in Thyolo is less frequent than in the rest of 
the country. The reasons are compound. On the one hand the great majority of estates in Mangochi 
are much younger than the tea estates in Thyolo who mostly were established as freeholds at the 
turn of last century. Exact borders are often not well known in Mangochi. The much wealthier 
estates in Thyolo also employ private security firms. Besides, in Mangochi government’s 
expropriation of customary land mainly took place after independence and the risk of conflict is 
obviously greater when cultivation takes place on land which is collectively remembered to have 
been cultivated by the near parents of the present population. More idle land is found in Mangochi 
and that increases the risk even further.  
 
The difference in number of court cases is not exclusively linked to the importance of encroachment 
practices. The economic and social relationships in Thyolo between the tea estates and the local 
population are old and well established where the estates have a long register of means in handling 
controversies that may arise. They therefore seldom need the courts, but manage to impose 
acceptable solutions in collaboration with the traditional authority and the persons involved.  
 
Even though conflicts between estate holders and holders of customary land neither concern 
customary tenure nor the customary justice system as such, the cases clearly reveal how much 
easier it is for estate holders to maintain land security and exercise rights compared to holders of 
customary land. As long as a valid lease contract, including survey notes, can be produced 
magistrates and judges say they consider such cases as uncomplicated and straightforward and they 
                                                     
38 Peters, Bewitching Land. 
39 L. D. Mapemba, ‘The Abandonment of Estates; A report of the Exploratory Study of Abandoned Estates 1997’, 
(unpublished report produced as part of the Estate Land Utilization Study, Lilongwe 1997) 
40 Many of the cases include allegations from one complainant against several defendants. The total number of 
defendants in the eight cases is uncertain since one of the cases is raised against a village headman and an 
unspecified number of villagers (M6). 
41 R. J. G. Steel, J. L. Bosworth, S. J. Gosage, and C. Mataya, ‘The Tea Plantations of Malawi: a Report of the Tea Estates 
Surveys 1996 and 1997’ (unpublished report produced as part of the Estate Land Utilization Study, Lilongwe, 1997). 
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have to judge in favour of the estate. In all the eight cases we examined judgements were in favour 
of the estate holders. Access to freehold no longer exists and access to leasehold requires wealth as 
well as connections to the wealthiest and most influential members of the elite. For village members 
leasehold is seldom a realistic option to increase ones land. Nevertheless, the trespass cases clearly 
illustrate how increased legal coherence improves on the predictability and security connected to 
investments in land for the wealthier segments of the population.  
 
However, the question of encroachment on estates also reveals how private land in Malawi cannot 
be seen in complete isolation from customary tenure and the weaknesses embedded in the concept 
of a dualistic land structure. People encroach on estates for various reasons but in all eight cases the 
leaseholders were people from outside the district in which the estate was located, and in most cases 
the encroachment took place when the land was lying idle. Hence, according to the principles of 
customary tenure, traditional leaders and encroaching farmers maintained in court that they did not 
understand why trespass in their case had to be considered an offence. 
 
In one case (M1) the plaintiff sued six men that had encroached on the estate of his mother. He also 
complained that the locals were making it hard for him to graze his cattle. Efforts through the 
traditional authority and the District Commissioner to get the people off the land proved futile. 
Some had already built permanent structures on the plots they had occupied. In their defence the 
defendants said that the land was given to them by the village headman and that ‘[i]t did not look 
like a place owned by a person’ and ‘…the estate [buildings] is far from this place’. The village 
head indicated that the land he had given the defendants was one he had inherited from his parents. 
He also alleged that the mother of the plaintiff had once begged him to remove the people in 
exchange for MK 30, 000 and that this deal should not be made known to the chief. He indicated 
that when he consulted the chief, the latter told him not to remove the people. The chief even 
provided each of the six defendants with a ‘letter of authority’ saying they were rightfully 
occupying the land. Due to the existence of a valid deed the magistrate ruled in favour of the 
plaintiff and ordered the defendants to vacate the land until December 2014 when the lease expires.  
 
Encroachments of this type were sometimes situated in a politicised rhetoric which improved the 
argument for re-appropriation. It was argued that when the one-party government of Dr. Banda in 
the 1970s and 1980s expropriated land to give (lease) to its political allies, it was futile and even 
dangerous to resist or to oppose the government even if the local farmers considered the land in 
question as theirs. ‘Now was the time for justice to be restored’ was the message between the lines. 
 
Our findings support Mapemba42  when he claims that an important reason why estates are 
abandoned is because of long lasting disputes between estate holders and the local farmers. It 
proves that the leasers often have severe difficulties to stand the pressure established by the local 
villages. In the first instance the conflicts lead to reduced cultivation and increased areas of idle land 
which in the next instance lead to more encroachment and increased conflicts. Finally the lease 
holder may decide to abandon the estate all together. Mapenda reports that much of the idle estate 
land is being used by villagers from neighbouring villages and that the compliance with previous 
rulings generally is weak. In two of the eight cases village heads and their subjects were convicted 
for contempt of court for not abiding with earlier rulings to vacate the estates.  
 
Re-appropriation of estate land also takes place through negotiation between estate owners and the 
traditional authority. We observed how a chief in Mangochi was in tactful dialogue with several 
estate owners, whose land for various reasons was lying idle. Rather than confrontation his 
approach was a request based on the argument that acute shortage of customary land combined with 
idle estate land easily could produce serious conflicts. In two cases the chief obtained an informal 
                                                     
42 Mapenda, The Abandonment of Estates. 
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temporary permission for the surrounding villagers to cultivate on parts of the idle land. The two 
estates belong to persons originating from the district and whether estates owners from other 
districts would allow such arrangements is another question. It still remains to be seen though how 
they will affect coexistence in the future, but the work invested by the villagers will certainly not 
make it easy for the estate holders to reclaim his land. Also in Thyolo43 and Zomba44  it is reported 
that estates have found it difficult to evict villagers who initially were temporarily permitted to live 
and cultivate on their land. Steele et al. also alludes to the fact that most plantations in Thyolo, at 
some stage have relinquished land areas to villagers in neighbouring villages on a more permanent 
basis.  
 
There can be little doubt that Malawian entrepreneurs interested to expand their agricultural 
activities will prefer investments in private rather than in customary land. The possession of a deed 
does certainly not provide full security of tenure, both national authorities as well as the 
neighbouring populations may challenge their rights. However, compared to the inherent dilemmas 
produced by the ambiguities in customary tenure, the security on own investments seems much 
better on private land. The widespread encroachment practices by smallholders on private land also 
demonstrate how private land, despite some of it having originated more than a century back in 
time, still is very much subject to re-negotiation, re-definition and re-appropriation into customary 
land. By 1894 her Majesty’s Commissioner Harry Johnston had approved private land claims in 
Nyasaland covering 1.5 million ha.45 By 1995 the estimated land area under the control of estate 
holders was close to 1 million ha.46 In the meantime the area first decreased considerably before it 
started increasing again sometimes in the 1960s or 70s. Whether it is still on the increase or it has 
started to decrease is not possible to say. Our concern is simply to show that the system of 
customary tenure –even within a realm external to its own legal mandate – still proves an effective 
means when rural people try to protect themselves against the expansion of wealthier and more 
powerful segments of the population. The customary system has its own ways of getting back what 
it deems belongs to itself. 
Conclusions 
Despite increased social and economic differentiation in the Malawian society and no reduction in 
the level of poverty among the millions of rural smallholders, we find that the inherent ambiguities 
and contradictions in customary tenure tend to increase the land security among smallholders rather 
than to reduce it. Few - if any - indications in our data point towards something else, whether we 
talk of the country’s political economy in general, the existing land distribution patterns or the way 
conflicts over land are being dealt with. The study of what we have called the ‘customary justice 
system’ shows how difficult it is for more powerful and/or wealthier people to utilise the system. 
This is particularly true if they are considered foreigners in the village, but it also applies for the 
local elites. Over the years the traditional authority has in many ways increased its powers and its 
position. They even managed to stop the introduction of a new land policy approved by government 
in 2002.47 Despite this power the traditional leaders do not increase their own landholdings in the 
villages. Instead of investing in customary land the local elites choose other venues deemed more 
                                                     
43 Steele et.al., The Tea  Plantations of Malawi 
44 White, Magomero. 
45 Pachai, Malawi: the History of the Nation., p.100. The figure of 1.5 million ha is not directly comparable to today’s 
figure. It includes large areas controlled by the British South Africa Company which was returned to the colonial 
administration during the 1930s.  
46 Anon., Land People and Production. 
47 Government of Malawi, ‘Malawi National Land Policy’, (Lilongwe, Ministry of Lands, Physical Planning and Surveys, 
January 2002). See also P. Kishindo, ‘Customary land tenure and the new land policy in Malawi’, Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies, 22, 2 (2004), pp. 213-225.    
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interesting. This socially levelling effect also applies with reference to the struggles regarding the 
legal classification of different land areas. We agree with Peters when she reminds us how easy it is 
for the government to expropriate customary land under the existing judicial arrangements.48 
However, that is because all land in the country explicitly is state property and not because of the 
ambiguities in the customary tenure. We have illustrated how those ambiguities continuously are 
being successfully used by the local populations to re-appropriate estate land which government so 
easily took from them. As may have been noted we have all the way made extensive use of Pauline 
Peters’ own excellent analyses on customary tenure in Malawi which in our opinion more tend to 
support rather than to contradict our conclusions.  
 
As discussed in the introduction, a conclusion that poor people manage to use customary tenure and 
the customary justice system to improve on their land security does not automatically mean that the 
system can be considered well adapted as a mechanism in the efforts to improve smallholder 
agriculture and improve its productivity. Such a debate is a different one and requires a very 
different type of data and analysis. But improved agricultural production seems by everyone to be 
considered a crucial element in the combat against poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. We may 
therefore very well find ourselves confronted with a tremendous paradox in that customary tenure is 
found to protect the land security of the poor at the same time as it may be found to complicate 
changes deemed necessary in the combat against poverty. As we see it, too little emphasis has until 
now been put on this dilemma and how it can be dealt with. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
48 Peters, The Limits of Negotiability. 
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